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Jim McGregor
Writer on HMS Tetcott from
May – October 1943.
When the ship was at Action Stations, Jim was on the bridge taking notes of everything that happened and recording all the Captain’s comments.
These notes were subsequently typed, and formed the basis of the Captain’s official reports.
Some of the notes made during Operation Husky are shown below, together with the relevant part of the report submitted by
Lieutenant Commander Richard Rycroft.
JIM'S NOTEBOOK
JIM'S TYPED NOTES
THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY RICHARD RYCROFT
Lieutenant Commander in Command
HMS Tetcott Official Report
on Operation Husky
HMS Tetcott
19 July 1943
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report of proceedings of HMS Tetcott under my command during Operation Husky – all times are minus two.
Saturday 10 July 1943
At 05:55 I proceeded ahead at six knots acting in accordance with orders contained in HON ACID and HON ACID JIG. I was unable to hear asdic buoy but obtained a fix by the light of flares dropped in the heavy raid on Syracuse. This put me about three miles off shore but half a mile to the northward of my correct position. In the light of later events it is likely that I was in my correct position and that I sent the landing craft in half a mile too far south.
The first wave of landing craft passed me at 02:20 followed by the second at 02:37. These were followed by two more landing craft who said their compasses were broken so at 02:45 I closed the coast with these two landing craft in company.
As surprise had not apparently been lost on JIG beach, although it was after zero hour I did not close nearer than two miles from the coast until 04:15 when a searchlight apparently at the northern end of JIG beach started giving trouble. I decided not to open fire as I could see our own troops were very close and I should probably have done more harm than good. At 05:10 I closed the coast looking for batteries to engage and opened fire on battery target Number 32 (Map Ref 970069). This had the effect of taking his fire off the beaches on to me, but it was very poor and nothing fell with 1,000 yards of me.
I then saw that battery target Number 31 (Map Ref 990104) was giving trouble on the beaches and opened fire on him at 05:59, followed by HMS Mauritius about two minutes later. I ceased fire so as not to confuse Mauritius and went back to my former target (32) who was again giving trouble on the landings and opened fire. As a result this battery stopped firing and was not seen to fire again until at least 09:45, when I went on anti-submarine patrol, although the battery was carefully watched.
At 06:35 a battery of three guns about half way between the plotted positions of S1 and S7 (Map Ref 014200), opened fire on the beaches, and so I closed in nearer the shore and opened fire on him at 06:41. This had the effect of silencing the battery who also was not seen to fire again until I left the beach, this battery being also carefully watched.
Unfortunately I was unable to get into either W/T or V/S touch with my forward observation officer. As a result I was unable to open fire on what appeared to be a small mortar in a factory (Map Ref 006124) about half a mile to the south of Avola. The reason for not opening fire was that I knew our troops were in Avola at that time, but did not know how close they were to the target or even if it was our own men firing. I later learned from a fire-call to Aphis that it was a strongly held enemy position with a pillbox.
At 09:45 I was ordered to reinforce the anti-submarine chain patrol and took charge of the northern portion. Nothing of interest occurred until about 16:00 when fire was opened on a number of single enemy planes who had been bombing the beaches. Intermittent firing continued for some minutes.
At 19:10 several fighter-bombers flew low past the stern presenting an excellent target for pom-pom and Oerlikons. One bomb was jettisoned about a quarter of a mile on my port quarter and one aircraft came down to the northward of Cape Murro Di Porco.
Anti-submarine patrol continued during the night without incident except for HMS Exmoor being apparently near missed during the dusk bombing attack. I arranged for white smoke to be made by ships on the inboard leg of the patrol during the dusk period and a guard was kept all night on Type 285 searching for E-boats and/or low flying aircraft.
Sunday 11 July 1943
During the dawn air attack I opened fire with 4-inch on a Ju88, which appeared to be about to menace a minesweeper. The aircraft crashed in flames and is claimed as definitely mine. It fell about three or four miles to the north of Cape Di Porco.
About 08:00 HMS Beaufort took charge of the northern anti-submarine patrol.
At 10:45 I went close inshore chasing what I thought was a periscope. It turned out to be nothing more than the trailing wire of a barrage ballon, which had broken adrift.
At 12:30 I opened fire with 4-inch on a large formation of aircraft bombing the shipping. There were no apparent results, but I probably assisted in breaking up the formation for the benefit of the fighters.
I continued on anti-submarine patrol for the remainder of the day. I was too far away to be able to render any effective help with H/A fire during the various air raids, which took place during the afternoon and evening. At dusk the wind was in the wrong direction for me to make smoke.
Monday 12 July 1943
As soon as the dawn air raid was over and there was no further immediate risk of air attack on the convoy I proceeded towards Ennerdale to oil. On my way there I was told by Prinz Albert to shell Ocean Peace so as to flood Numbers One and Two holds and extinguish fire, which was raging in her fore part. The fire had got too much of a hold to make this effective and at 06:55 I secured alongside Ennerdale to oil. I left Ennerdale at 10:15 and resumed patrol.
A ‘Red’ warning was received at 11:48 and at 11:50 I opened fire on a large group of bombers. My fire was not very accurate which was just as well since the aircraft were American Mitchells who only fired their recognition signals after I had opened fire.
At 17:15 I was told by NCFA to detail one Hunt to escort Ulster Monarch landing Commandos at Augusta and decided to go myself. We left ACID beaches at 17:40 and arrived off Augusta at 19:00. At 19:15 Ulster Monarch proceeded towards her release position and I stationed myself three cables off her starboard bow so as to be in the best possible position to give supporting fire. At 19:25 Ulster Monarch lowered her assault craft and a light high velocity gun opened fire from the ridge (Map Ref 96512) overlooking Augusta. It gave its position away by the smoke and I opened fire with 4-inch which quickly silenced it. There was also some machine gun fire from some cement works near the shore and I proceeded to close as near as prudent – about three cables – and blasted the place with 4-inch, pom-pom and Oerlikon. The effect was terrific, especially as first HHMS Kanaris and later HMS Nubian joined in. One gun however went on firing for some minutes, shifting his fire from the assault craft to the ships, but he hit nothing. I also searched some vineyards with 4-inch to discourage any enemy who might still be lurking in them. A two-gun light howitzer battery also opened fire, apparently with no spotting or organised control. He did no damage but I was quite unable to spot where it was firing from. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion
I consider that the undoubted success of my bombardments, during which I fired about 600 rounds of 4-inch ammunition, was mainly due to the following reasons:
First: A great deal of time and trouble had been taken to train the ship’s armament in bombardment procedure for the avowed purpose of the invasion of Europe.
Second: I intended to act offensively and lose no chance of opening fire, subject to the safety of our own men ashore.
Third: The invaluable assistance of my Bombardment Liaison Officer, Captain R G Cooper, RA.
And last: But by no means least. I have a keen and experienced ship’s company who had every intention of adding to their score against the enemy.
I consider that in the action against the E-boat (paragraph 23) the Director and TS Crews were exceedingly prompt in changing over from one form of fire control procedure to another. The Type 285 radar gave excellent results in this action as well as in the engagement against aircraft (paragraph 11).
Recommendations for awards in accordance with your Memorandum Number 52, dated 15 June 1943, will follow at the first opportunity.
I have the honour to be sir,
Your obedient servant
Richard Rycroft
Lieutenant Commander in Command
HMS Tetcott
To:
The Naval Commander, Force ‘A’
HMS Bulolo
Copies to:
The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet
The Commander-in-Chief, Levant
(Through the Commodore (D), Levant)
The Commander (D), 5th Destroyer Flotilla, HMS Dulverton
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